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Abstract—We study how erasure coding can improve service
reliability in Data Center Networks (DCN). To this end, we find
that coding can be best deployed in systems, where i) traffic
is split into multiple parallel sub-flows, ii) each sub-flow is
encoded; iii) SFC along with their corresponding Virtual Network
Functions (VNF) concatenated are replicated into at least as many
VNF instances as there are sub-flows, resulting in parallel sub-
SFCs; and iv) all coded sub-flows are distributed over parallel
paths and processed in parallel. We study service reliability
as function of the level of parallelization within DCN and the
resulting amount of redundancy. Based on the probability theory
and by considering failures of path segments, VNF and server
failures, we analytically derive the probability that parallel sub-
flows are successfully processed by the parallelized SFC and that
the original serial traffic can be successfully recovered without
service interruptions. We compare the proposed failure protection
with coding and the standard backup protection and evaluate
the related overhead of both methods, including decoding, traffic
redirection and VNF migration. The results not only show the
benefit of our scheme for reliability, but also a reduced overhead
required in comparison to backup protection.
Index Terms—VNF, SFC, Reliability, Coding, Combinatorial
analysis, Parallelism
I. INTRODUCTION
Network Function Virtualization (NFV) enables a virtual-
ization of traditional network functions by replacing them
with Virtual Network Functions (VNFs) allocated typically in
virtual machines (VMs) or containers in data center networks
(DCN). In NFV-based DCNs, the failure of any VNF within
the service function chain (SFC) disrupts the entire chain caus-
ing service interruptions. An VNF failure is typically a result
of hardware (server) or software (VM) failures, or connectivity
loss (failure of path segments). To achieve the required level of
SFC reliability, the backup-based VNF protection is utilized.
To be effectively used, a backup protection requires fast failure
detection and fast reaction of detected failures, to minimize the
traffic losses. At the same time, it requires VNF migration and
traffic redirection [1]–[6].
In this paper, we study how instead of backup protection,
a systematic erasure coding can improve service reliability
in DCNs, while alleviating or even eliminating the challenges
associated with VNF failure detection, fast VNF migration and
traffic redirection. To this end, we find that coding can be best
deployed in systems, where traffic is split into multiple parallel
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sub-flows (parallelized). Since DCNs usually deploy Equal
Cost Multipath Protocol (ECMP), which breaks large flows
into parallel sub-flows and uniformly distributes the resulting
sub-flows over the network [7]–[9], the idea of deploying
traffic parallelism for reliability is also practically valid. The
novelty of our system is that we encode each sub-flow and
replicate VNFs of each SFC along, resulting in parallel sub-
SFCs. Finally, all coded sub-flows are distributed over multiple
parallel paths and processed in parallel.
This paper presents an analytical study of the impact of cod-
ing on SFC reliability in traffic-, flow- and path-parallelized
DCNs. In case of VNF failures, we show that there is no need
for complex failure detection, time consuming VNF migrations
and traffic redirection. We compare VNF failure protection
with systematic erasure coding and backup failure protection.
Based on the probability theory and the reliability of the indi-
vidual VMs, servers and path segments, we derive analytical
expressions for evaluating the SFC (service) reliability. We
define the overhead of backup protection as the need for VNF
migration and traffic redirection, while the overhead of coding
protection as a need for the computationally intensive decod-
ing. The results show that, compared to backup protection,
the coding protection can provide higher service reliability
and lower probability for decoding than probability for VNF
migration and traffic redirection. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first study to analyze a suitability of erasure coding
to improve the service reliability in DCNs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the reference network architecture. The methods for
VNF failure protection are drawn in Section 3. Section 4
presents the reliability analysis. Numerical results are shown
in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. DCN model
The DCN hardware fabric consists of racks with multiple
servers, links and two types of switches: Top-of-Rack (ToR)
and intermediate forwarding switches. ToR switches provide
connectivity to every server within the rack and to every
intermediate switch in the DCN. The intermediate switches are
connected to all ToRs and perform forwarding across racks.
We assume that the traffic towards other racks is routed by the
source ToR, while the intermediate switches just forward the
traffic between racks based on concepts of segment routing
(SR) [10]. For example, the source ToR in the source rack
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Fig. 1. a) Serial DCN traffic: traffic flow f is sent over one path through one
SFC; b) Parallel VNFs with replications and parallel SFCs: Traffic flow f is
parallelized into k = 3 sub-flows (f1, f2, f3); SFC is parallelized into k = 3
sub-SFCs; parallel sub-flows are sent over k parallel paths through k parallel
sub-SFCs. c) Parallelism in DCN and VNF placement: parallel sub-SFCs are
distributed over N = 2 servers each and disjoint from each other; parallel
sub-flows are sent over parallel disjoint paths and different servers.
addresses the destination ToR in the destination rack by packet
labeling and sends traffic to a certain intermediate switch.
The intermediate switches perform only label lookups to
route the traffic to the destination ToR. SR allows to change
an end-to-end path utilized over the network, whereby the
source ToR switch needs only to change the label. This is
an important capability of a DCN network in case of backup
VNF protection.
We assume that each server can host multiple VMs and
a virtual switch (vS), e.g., programmable hypervisor switch.
Each VM allocates one VNF only. All VMs are connected to
a vS, which selects one VNF for processing of arrived packets
and provides a connectivity to the ToR switch. The ordered
sequence of VNFs builds an SFC. Fig. 1a) shows an example
of an SFC, which consists of 5 different VNFs allocated in
DCN. Different network functions read/write different parts
of received packet during its operation, header or payload or
both. We refer to VNFs, which read or write packet header
only, as header-VNFs (h-VNF) and to VNFs, which read or
write packet payload, as payload-VNFs (p-VNF). The most
of VNFs considered in the example are h-VNFs, while only
NAT changes the header and only IDS is p-VNF, i.e., looks
at payload. To complete the service, all packets need to be
processed in order. In our example, all incoming packets
are first registered by passive probing function (Probe), then
Firewall (FW) proves if traffic is allowed to pass through DCN.
The legitimate packets from FW are processed by Network
Address Translation (NAT), which replaces the IP addresses
and port numbers in packet header. After that, packets are
sent to an Intrusion Detection System (IDS), which copies
the flow to perform offline traffic analyses to identify and log
violations. Finally, in the Traffic Shaper (TSp), the packets are
categorized and queued to meet a certain quality of service
(QoS).
B. Parallelism in DCN
Without loss of generality, let us simplify the definition of
traffic flow or flow as a large number of IP packets with the
same IP addresses and port numbers in the header. In this
section, we discuss in detail three following concepts that
we apply to DCN parallelism: 1) Traffic Parallelism: a serial
traffic flow is split into a number of parallel sub-flows at
the sender; 2) SFC Parallelism: all VNFs of a certain SFC
are replicated into as many VNF instances as there are sub-
flows, resulting in parallel sub-SFCs; and 3) Path Parallelism:
all parallel sub-flows are independently transmitted over link
disjoint paths and processed in parallel by parallel disjoint
sub-SFCs, distributed over different servers.
1) Traffic Parallelism: Traffic spreading is a well known
technique to improve load balancing on the network interfaces
[7], [8]. As shown in Fig. 1b), any traffic flow f can be split
(parallelized) into k = 3 sub-flows, i.e., f1, f2 and f3. To
realize traffic parallelism via traffic spreading, however, the
incoming traffic needs to be sorted into different flows based
on source and destination IP addresses and port numbers in
packet headers. This is because different traffic flows would
require different SFCs. Finally, packets of any certain flow f
can be distributed over k interfaces in Round Robin fashion
building k parallel sub-flows. When outgoing DCN traffic
needs to be sent in serial fashion, after service completion
by the certain SFCs, all packets from all flows and sub-flows
need to be serialized into one data stream based, for instance,
on FIFO.
2) SFC Parallelism: Generally, parallel sub-flows can be
either sent to the same VNF instances of an SFC, or a separate
replicas of an SFC, consisting of certain VNFs, needs to be
created for each sub-flow. For the latter, which we call SFC
parallelism, all VNFs of certain SFC are replicated into k
VNF instances resulting in k parallel sub-SFCs. As a result,
each sub-flow passes its own sub-SFC as shown in Fig. 1b).
This can be implemented with SFC Encapsulation as proposed
in [11], whereby each parallel sub-SFC can be characterized
as Service Function Path with special ID. For that reason,
each packet requires an additional Network Service Header
with Service Path Identifier of 24 bits as discussed in [12]. It
is necessary that all k VNF replicas of certain type process
packets of certain flow based on same rules and with same
processing result. For instance, all k NAT replicas in Fig.
1b) have to replace IP addresses and ports in the packet
headers independent of sub-flow by the same predefined IP
addresses and ports. Thus, the parallel VNFs need some kind
of management unit for its coordination and rule update. When
flow and SFC parallelism are deployed, the synchronization
Fig. 2. Backup protection: a) Network view: SFC is parallelized into k = 3 active and r redundant backup sub-chains; switches inside DCN can redirect
any sub-flow from failed VNF to backup VNF of the same type; b) Server view: active and backup sub-SFCs are distributed over N = 2 servers, sub-flows
f1 is redirected to backup servers S7 and S8, respectively; backup VNF3 is activated to reduce latency.
between VNFs of the same type can be provided by an external
state repository, which can store internal states of VNFs [1].
3) Path Parallelism: In general, to reach better reliability,
VNFs from different sub-SFCs should not be placed in the
same server. This prevents the usage of the same links and
servers by parallel sub-flows and, thus, additionally increases
reliability. Thus, after traffic parallelization, the k parallel sub-
flows should be sent over k parallel link and server disjoint
paths, i.e., through k disjointedly placed sub-SFCs. Then, each
parallel sub-flow passes through its own sub-SFC, which is
distributed over N servers. Fig. 1c) illustrates a possible sub-
SFCs placement within DCN, whereby VNFs of any sub-SFC
for a certain sub-flow are distributed over N = 2 servers and
disjoint from other sub-SFCs, e.g., sub-SFC of black sub-flow
f3 is placed in servers S4 and S6 and disjoint from other sub-
SFCs (blue and purple) placed in S1-S3 and S5. Thus, the
VNFs of the same type are placed in different servers, e.g.,
VNFs1, VNFs2 and VNFs3, are distributed over servers S1,
S3 and S4. Any flow is successfully processed by certain SFC,
when all parallel sub-flows passed its sub-SFC and meet in the
same server to be serialized to leave DCN.
C. Failure model
We consider three type of failures, i.e., failures of servers,
VNFs and connections between servers (path segments). The
switches in DCN are assumed as highly reliable and never fail.
Since we assume that each VM reserves as many resources as
required for one VNF to serve incoming packets, the failure
of any VM causes failure of one only VNF. The server failure,
in contrast, causes failure of all VMs running on this server
and, thus, failure of multiple VNFs. Finally, any failure of path
segments results in no connectivity to a certain server. This is
equivalent to the server failure and failure of all VNFs running
on that server. As shown in Fig. 1c), each sub-SFC can be
allocated in two different servers, each path for each sub-flow
consists of three path segments, i.e., 9 disjoint path segments
totally, any of which can fail. A failure of path segments
between S1 and S2 is a failure of server S2 and VNF4 and
VNF5 of second (blue) sub-SFC. Usually any VNF failure,
e.g., due to VM, server or path segment failures, requires a new
VNF instantiation or VNF migration and traffic redirection.
III. FAILURE PROTECTION
A parallelized SFC is characterized by a certain level of
reliability, which depends on the reliability of the underlying
VNFs, servers and path segments. To increase the SFC reli-
ability, we next consider two protection methods: A) backup
resources; and B) systematic erasure coding.
A. Backup protection
To protect active h-VNFs and p-VNFs over all parallel sub-
SFCs, a parallelized SFC can use a parallel backup sub-SFCs.
In case of VNF failure, the backup VNFs of backup sub-SFC
can replace any failed VNF of the same type over any sub-flow.
According to [1], [2], to provide reliable communications, the
most effective VNF deployment is to utilize multiple switches
inside the DCN between individual VNFs, such as vS, ToR and
intermediate switches, which can detect failure and redirect
traffic to the corresponding available backup VNF, when the
connection to an active server or VNF fails. Fig. 2a) illustrates
the idea, whereby SFC is parallelized into k = 3 active and
Fig. 3. Protection with systematic erasure coding: a) packet encoding process and generation of GCH; b) VNF deployment in case of VNF failures. The 3
parallel sub-flows are encoded into 4 parallel sub-flows and SFC is parallelized into 4 sub-SFCs. Encoded sub-flows are sent over disjoint paths to disjoint
servers through disjoint sub-SFCs. The loss of main sub-flow f1 due to failure of VNF2 of sub-SFC1 results in decoding need.
r = 1 backup sub-SFCs. The k = 3 parallel sub-flows are
sent over 3 parallel disjoint paths through 3 sub-SFCs. Since
VNF2 of sub-SFC1 fails, the switch inside the DCN redirects
sub-flow f1 to VNF2 of backup sub-SFC 4.
Fig. 2b) shows a possible placement and deployment of
backup sub-SFC in DCN. Just like an active sub-SFCs, a
backup sub-SFC is distributed over N = 2 servers in Rack4
providing the most reliable placement of backup VNFs. In this
example, active VNF2 of sub-flow f1 fails. The sub-flow f1
is redirected to backup server S7, where VNF2 and VNF3 are
activated to replace original VNF2 and VNF3 from server S3.
The backup VNF3 on server S7 is activated to avoid sending
f1 back to S3 and, thus, additional delays. As a result, f1 is
processed by backup VNF2 and VNF3 on S7 and, then, sent
to S5 to complete the service by VNF4 and VNF5 in Rack 3.
B. Protection with erasure coding
The use of Forward Error Correction (FEC) codes such as
erasure coding is a classical solution to improve the reliability
of multicast and broadcast transmissions. Erasure codes can
add redundancy into data to protect it against losses. Any (n,
k) erasure code encodes k units of original data into n units
of coded data, in which any k out of n units can recover the
original data and, thus, the code can tolerate the failures of up
to r = n−k data units. We refer to any k units of original data
encoded together as generation and to r additional data units
generated by encoding as redundancy. Most erasure codes
deployed in practice are systematic codes, meaning that the
k original data units are unchanged after encoding and only
the r redundant data units present a linear combination of k
original data units. Thus, that k data units of coded data can
be directly accessed without prior decoding. In contrast, when
at least one out of k unchanged data units is lost, any out
of r redundant units from the same generation replaces the
lost data unit, while decoding is required to recover k original
data units. The decoding is only successful, if at least k data
units from each generation arrive at the decoder. For VNF
protection with coding, we assume that each parallel sub-flow
can be presented as a sequence of data units, whereby the
original and encoded data units have the same predefined size.
We refer to the k parallel sub-flows, which are unchanged after
encoding, as main sub-flows, and to the sub-flows, which are
built by redundancy as redundant sub-flows.
To be able to recover both header and payload, we propose
to encode both, i.e., the whole packets, which are interpreted
as a data unit by encoder. An example of encoding process
is illustrated in Fig. 3a, where k = 3 parallel sub-flows
encoded to generate r = 1 redundant sub-flow. The three
original packets, one from each parallel sub-flow, are built
generation and combined together into the green redundant
packet. In contrast to original packets, which are unchanged
after encoding, the redundant packet does not have any header
or readable payload, while belonging now to the same flow
as original packets and needs to pass through same chain
of VNFs. Usually, VNFs are only able to process uncoded
data. Thus, there is a need for new header for generated
redundant packets in accordance with original header. Thus,
we propose to utilize a generalized coding header (GCH). As
presented in Fig. 3a, the original headers are copied to generate
a certain GCH with the same source/destination addresses and
the same port numbers as determined for the original traffic
flow. The generator of GCH (Generation of GCH) utilize
a copy of original IP and TCP headers and change some
header fields: 1) In the IP-GCH, the Header Length, Total
Length and Header Checksum are adapted to the coded packet
length; 2) In the TCP-GCH, data offset and header checksum
needs to be changed. Moreover, the sequence numbers need
to be redefined to identify the packets belonging to the same
generation. Based on this new sequence number in TCP-GCH,
the decoder can recognize packets from the same generation
required for successful flow recovery or decoding. Finally,
the GCHs (gray) are attached to the certain encoded packet.
Additionally, the metadata can be inserted to each packet to
hold information related to coding process, e.g., the number of
main and redundant sub-flows, generation size, etc. As a result,
any h-VNF can process (read/write) GCH and, thus, coded
redundant packets. The information from GCH is copied to
the original header after any flow recovery or any decoding.
Without loss of generality, the encoding (decoding) process
requires packet buffering and clocking to build generations.
That can be implemented by VNFs such as Traffic Shaper.
Fig. 3b shows the VNF protection by systematic erasure
code, where the original flow f is parallelized into k = 3 sub-
flows. The parallel sub-flows are encoded into n = 4 sub-flows
providing r = 1 redundancy. That requires r = 1 redundant
sub-SFCs. In the example, there are k = 3 main sub-flows after
Fig. 4. Deployment and placement of sub-SFCs in DCN in case of Hybrid protection: Coded sub-flows need to be decoded prior to processing by VNF4.
encoding, f1, f2 and f3, while redundant sub-flow presents a
linear combination of them. After encoding, the sub-flows are
sent over n = 4 disjoint paths through n = 4 parallel sub-
SFCs. The VNF2 of sub-SFC1 fails, resulting in loss of the
main sub-flow f1. The blue (f2), black (f3) and green sub-
flows (k = 3) arrive at destination, whereby the recovery of
original flow is possible by decoding. The decoding is only
required, when at least one out of k main sub-flows is lost.
However, the loss of at most r sub-flows can be tolerated. In
contrast to the presented example in Fig. 3b, the decoding is
not required, if redundant (green) sub-flows were lost.
Any SFC generally consists of both h-VNFs and p-VNFs,
which process packet header and packet payload, respectively.
In contrast to h-VNFs, which are processing packet header
and, thus, can work with GCH, p-VNFs such as IDS can not
work with coded packets and require recovery of original sub-
flows or decoding prior to processing. As a results, p-VNFs
can be protected by backup only. Then, we propose to use
a hybrid backup-coding protection of SFC, which consists
of both h-VNFs and p-VNFs. An example of hybrid VNF
protection is presented in Fig. 4, where VNF4 is only a p-VNF,
which can need prior decoding and backup protection. After
traffic parallelization into k = 3 original sub-flows, i.e., f1, f2
and f3 and encoding them into n = 4 coded sub-flows. All
n = 4 sub-flows are sent over disjoint paths through different
sub-SFCs. The purple sub-flow (f1) is lost due to failure of
connection to S3 or failure of S3 or VNF2 failure. The 3
remaining sub-flows (blue, black and green) are successfully
processed by the first three h-VNFs of related sub-SFCs in
servers S1, S4 and S11. Since the main purple sub-flow is
lost, the decoding is required in S8 to recover all 3 original
sub-flows (purple, blue and black) prior to processing by p-
VNF4 (IDS). During decoding, the green redundant sub-flow
replaces the lost purple sub-flow. The recovered original sub-
flows are sent through different instances of VNF4 allocated in
servers S8, S9, S10. The r = 1 backup VNF4 in server S5 can
replace any failed active VNF4 requiring sub-flow redirection.
Finally, the original sub-flows are encoded in S9 into n = 4
sub-flows and sent to h-VNFs of type 5. The black VNF5 in
server S7 fails resulting in the lost of the main black sub-
flow and a need for decoding at destination prior to traffic
serialization.
IV. ANALYSIS
The analytical models for availability and reliability for
complex systems are interchangeable and only defined through
availability, or reliability, of the individual components [1].
Thus, we refer to the end-to-end service availability (reliabil-
ity) as service success, defined as a probability that at least
k parallel sub-flows of certain traffic flow can successfully
traverse k parallel sub-SFCs and be serialized at end-hosts.
We summarized the notations used in Table I. We assume that
each sub-SFC consists of Ψ different VNFs and each sub-
flow needs to pass all Ψ VNFs to complete the service. Here,
any N ≥ 1 servers allocate one sub-SFCs to serve one sub-
flow, whereby any server s ∈ [1, N ] of a certain sub-flow
contains ψs ≤ Ψ,
∑N
s=1 ψs = Ψ, different types of VNFs. To
ensure service success, r redundant network components can
be utilized in case some of k main components fail, where
r ≤ k. We denote the reliability values of main and redundant
servers and VM/VNFs as ϕ, ϕr and υ, υr, respectively, and
assume that these values are the same for all servers and VNFs.
Moreover, we assume that there exists a connection, i.e., a
path segment, to certain main or redundant server out of all
alternative connections to the same server with probability for
connectivity φ or φr, respectively. However, the value φ and
φr are the same for connectivity to any main and redundant
servers, respectively. Since any sub-SFC is distributed over N
servers, we need at least k(N + 1) main- and rN redundant
path segments. For the analysis below, we assume that the
failures of different components occur independently.
Without any failure protection, all path segments to any
server, all servers and VNFs have to be available. Here, kN
servers allocate k sub-SFCs to serve k sub-flows requiring
k(N+1) available paths segments. Thus, the service success is
R0(k) =
[
φN+1ϕN
N∏
s=1
υψs
]k
(1)
A. Backup protection
To provide service reliability, i.e., protection of k active sub-
SFCs, there are r backup (redundant) sub-SFCs allocated on
rN backup servers. In case of failures, the backup VNFs can
replace failed active VNFs of the same type. All active and
backup servers in DCN need to be connected by at least one
available path segment, whereby the path segment from the last
server to destination end-host within DCN has to be always
available. In contrast, a failure of any other path segment
to active or backup servers results in traffic redirection to a
reachable backup server. In this case, the path segment to a
certain backup server needs to be available. In other words,
when a server can not be reached due to connectivity failure,
the reachable backup server replaces this unreachable server.
For example, assume that only VNFs can fail with proba-
bility (1−υ). The service success is then a probability that at
least k over all k+r VNFs of any type do not fail and can serve
k sub-flows. Thus, at most r VNFs of any type can fail and
service success is R = [
∑r
i=0
(
r+k
i
)
(1− υ)iυr+k−i]Ψ, where
and
∑X
i=x ai = 0, if x > X . Using this general expression
and approach, we next derive the service success provided by
backup protection.
Since the allocation of backup sub-SFCs follows the al-
location principles of active sub-SFCs by design, r backup
sub-SFCs are distributed over (r · N) different servers, i.e.,
over N backup servers each. The k path segments to the
destination within DCN have to be available with probability
φk. Let us consider all k active and r backup servers of
type s, which contain ψs VNFs. Generally, at most ξ = r
connections to active servers can fail resulting in unavailability
of r active servers and of all rψs VNFs on these servers,
though without an impact on service success, if all redundant
backup components are available. If ξ path segments failed, the
service can be still completed, when at least ξ path segments
to ξ backup servers and ξ ·ψs backup VNFs of certain type are
available. Thus, at most γ = r − ξ path segments to backup
servers and f = r − ξ − γ other active servers and at most
l = r− ξ− γ− f backup servers can additionally fail without
an impact on the resulting service success. On all active and
backup servers, at most i = r− ξ−γ−f − l active and, then,
at most j = r − ξ − γ − f − l − i backup VNFs are allowed
to fail. As a result, the service success is derived as follows
Rb= φ
k
N∏
s=1
r∑
ξ=0
(
k
ξ
)
φk−ξ(1− φ)ξ
r−ξ∑
γ=0
(
r
γ
)
φr−γr (1− φr)γ
r−ξ−γ∑
f=0
(
k − ξ
f
)
ϕk−f−ξ(1− ϕ)f
r−ξ−γ−f∑
l=0
(
r−γ
l
)
ϕr−γ−lr
(1− ϕr)l
[ r−ξ−γ−f−l∑
i=0
(
k − ξ − f
i
)
(1− υ)iυk−ξ−f−i
r−ξ−γ−f−l−i∑
j=0
(
r − γ − l
j
)
(1− υr)jυr−γ−l−jr
]ψs
(2)
, where the first sum describes possible connectivity loss to
active servers, the second sum describes the connectivity loss
to backup servers, the third and forth sums consider possible
failures of remaining available active and backup servers,
respectively; and the fifth and sixth sums consider the failure
TABLE I
NOTATION
ϕ, ϕr reliability of the active, redundant server, respectively;
υ, υr reliability of VNF on active, redundant server, respectively;
φ, φr probability for connectivity to main, redundant server, respectively;
Ψ number of VNFs in a SFC and, thus, sub-SFC;
k number of parallel sub-flows and, thus, active sub-SFCs;
N number of active servers per sub-flow;
ψs number of VNFs allocated on server s ∈ [1, N ];
r number of redundant/backup sub-SFCs;
of active and backup VNFs available on connected active and
backup servers, respectively.
B. Protection with erasure coding
In case of header processing only, i.e., SFC consists of
h-VNFs only, protection with systematic erasure coding can
be applied. Then, the service reliability Rh or R
′
h of any
main or redundant sub-flow is generally independent from
other parallel coded sub-flows and is only the function of
connectivity, server and VNF reliability, i.e., φ, ϕ and υ or
φr, ϕr and υr, respectively.
Rh = ϕ
NυΨφN+1 or R
′
h = ϕ
N
r υ
Ψ
r φ
N+1
r (3)
Without coding and VNF redundancy, the service success
can be determined by Eq. (1). When r redundant sub-flows are
generated by encoding and sent over r parallel redundant paths
through r parallel redundant sub-SFCs, the service success can
be calculated with Eq. (4) as discussed below. In contrast to
backup protection, the connectivity to destination within DCN
(decoder) can fail with probability (1−φ) or (1−φr) without
degrading service success. The failures of connectivity will
result in acceptable traffic loss, whereby any lost sub-flow can
be recovered by decoding. The service success is a probability
that at least k sub-flows out of (k+r) parallel coded sub-flows
can reach the decoder and calculated as follows
Rc=
r∑
i=0
(
k
i
)
Rk−ih (1−Rh)i
r−i∑
j=0
(
r
j
)
R
′
h
r−j
(1−R′h)j (4)
, where the first sum consider possible loss of main sub-flows
and the second sum describes the possible affordable loss
of the remaining redundant sub-flows. Both losses, however,
are the result of server or VNF failure or connectivity loss
regarding Eq. (3).
In case of payload processing, the decoding is only possible,
if k out of k + r sub-flows are not interrupted and reach the
decoder. Thus, the service success probability depends on both
Rc and Rb. Let us assume that any SFC can be split into
multiple parts, i.e., Mh chained parts, where Ψh,i, 1 ≤ i ≤Mh,
VNFs can work with coded packets and process GCH, and Mp
chained parts with Ψp,j , 1 ≤ j ≤ Mp VNFs, which require
prior decoding and backup protection. Then, the total number
of different VNFs in any SFC is Ψ =
∑Mh
i=1 Ψh,i+
∑Mp
j=1 Ψp,j .
The service success in case of hybrid protection can be derived
as R = RMpb ·RMhc .
C. Analysis of Overhead
For the method of backup protection we define the overhead
as probability of VNF migration and traffic redirection, while
Fig. 5. Service success and Probability for Overhead vs number of parallel
sub-flows and redundant sub-SFCs.
for coding protection the overhead is defined as the probability
that the decoding is needed. In backup protection, each failed
VNF of certain type can be replaced by any out of r backup
VNFs of the same type through redirection of individual sub-
flows. Thus, the traffic redirection is required, if at least one
active VNF is not available. Let us derive the probability that
all k active sub-SFCs are available as
∏N
s=1(φϕυ
ψ
s )
k, then the
probability for traffic redirection is calculated as
PR = 1−
N∏
s=1
(φϕυψs )
k (5)
In case of coding protection, and since we apply systematic
erasure code, where k sub-flows are unchanged after encoding
and r sub-flows present a linear combination of the k original
sub-flows, the decoding is only required if at least one out
of k unchanged sub-flows is lost. There is no need for
decoding, when f ≤ r redundant sub-flows were lost. Thus,
the probability for decoding need can be derived as
Pdec=
r∑
f=1
r−f∑
i=0
(
k
f
)
Rk−fh (1−Rh)f
(
r
i
)
R
′
h
r−i
(1−R′h)i (6)
To decrease the probability for decoding need Pdec, the k
unchanged sub-flows can be sent over more reliable routes
and r redundant modified sub-flows over less reliable routes.
V. ANALYTICAL RESULTS
We now evaluate the service success and overhead of the
proposed VNF protection methods. We verify analytical results
by Monte-Carlo simulations, and find that the simulation
results overlapped with analytical results (with 95% confidence
interval) and are not shown for clarity. In all results, we assume
that VNF failure is more likely than connectivity or server
failures, and set N = 2 and Ψ = 4.
Fig. 5 shows the service success and the overhead probabil-
ity, as a function of the number of main and redundant parallel
sub-SFCs, i.e., k and r. In contrast to backup protection, which
provides high service success with a few redundant sub-SFCs,
the protection with coding outperforms backup protection, if
there are ≥ 60% redundant sub-SFCs. Service success can be
Fig. 6. Service success in case of k = 8 parallel sub-flows and r = 6
redundant sub-SFCs vs. Reliability of DCN components
Fig. 7. Service success and Probability for Overhead for k = 8 parallel
sub-flows vs number of redundant sub-SFCs. Solid lines: Main and redundant
components are equally reliable; doted lines: Redundant components are more
reliable; dashed lines: Main components are more reliable.
increased by increasing k and r. The overhead probability of
backup protection is independent from the amount of backups
and increases with increasing k. The probability of decoding
is less than the probability for traffic redirection, however,
increases with increasing k and r.
Fig. 6 shows the service success of both VNF protection
methods as a function of reliability of certain network com-
ponents, i.e., VNFs (ν = νr) or path segments (φ = φr) or
servers (ϕ = ϕr). The service success of backup protection is
almost independent from reliability value of VNFs and servers,
and increases with increasing connectivity. The service success
of coding protection increases with increasing component
reliability and outperforms backup protection for any values
of connectivity (φ = φr) and when the reliability of VNFs or
servers is higher than ≈ 0.95.
Fig. 7 shows the service success and the overhead probabil-
ity as a function of the number of redundant parallel sub-SFCs
r. Here, we compare three scenarios, where the main compo-
nents are equally, less or more reliable than the redundant com-
ponents. In all scenarios, the coding protection outperforms
the backup protection regarding the service success in case of
large redundancy, i.e., r > 0.5. In general, the third studied
scenario, i.e., ν >> νr, φ >> φr, ϕ >> ϕr, provides the
highest service success and the lowest overhead probability.
Fig. 8. Service success and Probability for Overhead for k = 4 and k = 8
parallel sub-flows and r = 3 and r = 4 redundant sub-SFCs, respectively, vs
number of VNFs in any sub-SFC.
Fig. 9. Service success and Probability for Overhead vs number of parallel
sub-flows and redundant sub-SFCs.
The lowest service success and the highest overhead is reached
in the first and second scenario, respectively.
Fig. 8 illustrates the service success and probability for over-
head as a function of the number of VNFs in any sub-SFC (Ψ)
and the number of main parallel sub-SFCs. Here, we assumed
a scenario, where the main components are more reliable than
the redundant components, i.e., ν >> νr, φ >> φr, ϕ >> ϕr.
The service success in case of backup protection is indepen-
dent from Ψ and increases with decreasing k. In contrast, the
service success decreases with increasing Ψ in case of coding
protection. The overhead probability increases with Ψ for both
protection methods and decreases with decreasing k, while
coding protection outperforms backup protection.
Finally, Fig. 9 shows the service success and the overhead
probability for the use case from Fig. 4, whereby we change
the amount of redundancy (backups) and compare the backup
protection of sub-SFCs with hybrid protection, i.e., coding
protection of VNFs1-VNFs3 and VNF5 and backup protection
of VNFs4. The hybrid protection outperforms the pure backup
protection for any k providing higher service success and
lower probability for decoding need, when the amount of
redundant resources is larger than 25%. When amount of
redundancy is less than ≈ 0.4 the highest service success can
be reach with high level of flow parallelization k = 8. In
contrast, the low level of flow parallelization k = 4 results
in high service reliability, when the amount of redundancy is
≥ 0.4. The minimal overhead can be reached, however, for
k = 4 for both protection methods.
VI. CONCLUSION
We analytically studied and compared backup failure pro-
tection and failure protection with systematic erasure coding
regarding the resulting service success and required overhead.
Based on the probability theory and by assuming that the
reliability of the individual VMs, servers and path segments
are known, we derived analytical expressions for evaluation of
the service success and the probability for additional overhead
such as VNF migration or the need for decoding. The results
showed that the highest end-to-end service success can be
reached, when the main active components (paths segments,
servers, VNFs) have the higher reliability than the utilized
redundant or backup components. The backup protection
shows benefits, when the number of VNFs in any sub-SFC
is high, e.g., more than 5 in studied use case. In contrast,
when any sub-SFC contains few VNFs, the coding protection
provides higher service success while requiring less reliable
path segments than backup protection. Moreover, coding pro-
tection showed lower probability for decoding, as compared to
probability for VNF migration and traffic redirection in case
of backup protection. We also showed, that a combination of
both methods increases the service success and decreases the
overhead significantly.
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